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In this paper, we will present an increased-security concept for systems administering patient-data and DICOM
(digital imaging and communication in medicine) images. The system presented here is an intranet/internet-
based PACS and has been developed at the institute of telematics (IT) [Hlu99]. The PACS is based on standard
network-protocols and has been created using DICOM – standard. See [Nem94] and [Rad99] for more
information. The system components have been designed in JAVA and have been distributed onto three
different computers. Two computers - equipped with several relational databases administered by JAVA servers
- were assigned to the intranet-component while the third computer is located on the internet and is equipped
with an user interface. The concept for increased security developed at the IT aims at protecting the intranet
against the internet. Interaction between the components on the internet and within the intranet should take
place via a secure connection. Patient data can either be sent encoded along with images or can be sent
separately from the raw image data. System users are entered into and administered by an user database. A
standard “registry” will act as the user database, allowing users to access data.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Applications that are based on an intranet and/or on
the internet offer a broad range of possibilities for
communication and data-visualisation. Several
exemplary applications used on the WWW have
shown that it is possible, with little effort, to
generate systems that are both user-friendly, potent
and support communication.
Existing library classifications can be used
for the simple implementation of data-input and for
the data-visualisation of image data. Using JAVA-
technology, already existing computer hardware
(PCs, Macintosh-computers and workstations) with
different operating systems can easily be integrated
into the system. To allow this integration, only two
conditions must be met: one, a JAVA-runtime
environment (JRE) for the operating system in use
and two, a browser with integrated JAVA-support.
In this context, this paper examines a JAVA-based,
intranet/internet-orientated transmission- and visu-
alisation system for medical images. Users of intra-
or internet may use this system to access medical
images stored in the database or stored locally and
allows them to use several DICOM-modalities.
2. PRESENTATION OF THE SYSTEM
Figure 1 [Hlu99] on next page shows the
internet/intranet information system for transferring
and editing DICOM data. The system consists of 5
basic components:
- the DICOM-database and the DICOM-archive
(computer 1),
- the web server and the DICOM database
(computer 2),
- the client internet browser (computer 3),
- user administration and
Figure 1
Structure of the internet/intranet information system for the transfer of DICOM data
- a mechanism for increased security that imitates
the lock principle (to ward of external attacking)
The DICOM data is located on computer 1
and partly on the DICOM database on computer 2.
The JAVA servers are installed on both computers,
thus realising links with relational DICOM
databases. A web server, a JAVA application and
program-logic (servlet classes, applet classes, JAVA
development kit (JDK), JAVA servlet development
kit (JSDK), JAVA database connectivity (JDBC)
and hypertext mark-up language (HTML) page) are
also installed on computer 2. An internet browser is
installed on the client computer. The client
administration represented as a directory service is
responsible for safe transmission of the codes from
the server to the client. Figure 2 on next page shows
the data-exchange between the components of this
system.
In its internet browser, the client displays
the internet address (URL = uniform resource
locator) of the medical institution’s internet/intranet
information system, thus calling up the first HTML
page. The user is now being asked to enter login
and password. Servlet 1 checks the entered values.
In case the authentication was unsuccessful, a new
HTML page 2 for the user’s personal information is
created by one of the servlets. After the data has
been checked, the user receives a personal login,
password, and code for the codification of the
DICOM data from the user administration. This
data as well as the user’s personal data is being
saved by servlet 2 on the database for personal data.
After successful authentication servlet 1 generates
HTML page 3 in order to indicate the parameters of
the DICOM images needed which have to be
searched for in the DICOM database. Next, servlet
3 is started by using HTML page 3 and the search
parameters are transferred to the servlet. Servlet 3
starts client JAVA application 1 which passes the
search parameters onto JAVA server 1 (computer 2)
and to JAVA server 2 (computer 1). Both JAVA
servers are searching the required information
through the SQL-interface on the DICOM database
and in the DICOM file system. The data found is
transmitted to the client JAVA application by the
JAVA server, thus creating file 1 with this data on
hard disc of computer 2. Servlet 3 then creates
HTML page 4 to call up a DICOM viewer applet
(DAV). The DAV reads file 1, then logs it into the
internet browser of the client (computer 3). To view
the scaled version of the DICOM image or the
original image the user has to press the button
`JPEG Preview` or the button `View original image`
or `View condensed image`.
In this case, the DAV starts HTML page 5.
The user states the name of the image and starts
servlet 4. Servlet 4 starts the client JAVA
application 2 and copies the name of the file. Client
JAVA application 2 analyses file 1 and determines -
based on the image name - the computer and the
directory where the image is stored and copies it
onto the hard disc of computer 2 as file 2. Servlet 4
then creates the next HTML page 6 which calls up
the DBV applet. The DBV applet reads file 2 and
logs it into the internet browser of the user
(computer 3). The information in the PAV applet
chart can be viewed by the user only after being
decoded. Analogously, the client should decode the
image in the DBV applet.
3. CONCEPT FOR INCREASED SECURITY
IN PATIENT DATABASES
The patient database - developed and implemented
at the institute of telematics - call for login in by the
physician as a first step (shown by figure 2 on next
page). This procedure - a nuisance to physicians
who have to use this system on a daily basis - can be
substituted by an authentication process through
certification. This way of entering the system
requires a trustworthy authority ( certificate author-
ity (CA)) to edit the certificates and pass them to the
users. Whenever a directory service is employed for
user administration, already existing properties can
be used for safe transmission of passwords.
Figure 2
Structure of data exchange between the components of the internet/intranet information system for the
transmission and the handling of DICOM data
To establish a SSL (secure socket layer) link
to the client, the directory service uses certificates
issued by a trustworthy authority. This protocol
must be assigned to the International Standard
Organisation – Open System Interconnection (ISO-
OSI) basic reference model of the security level. By
making use of the ´handshake´ method, the SSL-
protocol determines which version of the protocol
and which type of codification to use.
4. USING THE DIRECTORY SERVICE FOR
USER ADMINISTRATION
The lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP)
has furthered the idea of using browsers as a basis
for administrative tasks. LDAP is based on the
direct access protocol (DAP) which, in turn, is a
simplification of the standard X.500 [Alo99]. By
adding the standard X.509-based SSL [Net96],
[Hou99]), security between client and server can be
guaranteed. Any person wishing to be identified
through personal login and password has to apply
for a certificate at a certificate authority (CA).
Communication between server and client
via SSL proceeds as follows: The server sends a
certificate to the client together with a public key.
At the CA, the client verifies the certificate and
begins - if the identification was successful - with
the transfer of the data codified by the public key.
The server decodes the incoming data with its
private key. Next, in order to get identified by the
directory service, the client sends off its certificate.
The access rights of successfully identified
clients are predefined (reading, writing). When
being identified, the client “slips” into the “role” of
administrator, physician or medical technical
assistant (MTA). The certificate of the client
contains a public key as well.
When the certificate of the authenticating
directory service user has been accepted, the user
may use the directory service at the appropriate
access level without re-entering the password and
login. This process is called “single sign on”. Here,
Netscape Suite Spot is used for the administration
of LDAP, SSL and for certification mechanisms. In
this package, the personnel of the directory service
and the administration of the certificate-server is
carried out by directory administration.
All certificates of people, directory servers
and certificate servers contain the distinguished
name (dn) of their owner. This dn is needed for the
hierarchical classification of the registered servers
or of the registered personnel. It is composed of the
node identifier in the directory tree. The dn
determines the role of the certificate owner.
To transform a JAVA stand-alone applica-
tion into an applet, security management of the
Netscape Communicator 4.05 in Solaris 2.51 must
be taken into consideration. The security manage-
ment asks for the use of the java4.0 jar library and
for signing the JAVA-applet.
The library-classification is a component of
Netscape Communicators. In order to sign the
JAVA applet, the operating system must contain
Netscape’s signtool [Net99b].
Alternatively, Smartupdate [Net99a] can be
used. Smartupdate is restricted to Windows 9x and
Windows NT though and was not used therefore.
However, there is a possibility of escaping the
security mechanism (in case connections between
different computers need to be tested) by
supplementing one of the Netscape configuration
files.
Using Netscape Communicator’s security
mechanisms has an effect on the management of the
SLAP (stand alone LDAP database) [Uni96] which
contains personal data. A link to the directory
server is established via SSL by the applet code and
the HTML-implementation of JAVA script.
If client and server have successfully
exchanged certificates and certificates have been
checked and accepted, a SSL-link is established,
coding the ensuing interaction between client and
directory server.
Thus, important patient data can be
exchanged without the danger of third parties
“listening in” and filtering information from the
data flow.
Inner attacks can be prevented in logging
every action that may violates the system. If the
directory service is properly configured in setting
access rights, the modification of files so that third
persons gain access to the system can be prevented
by logging and assigning access rights to data or
functionality. Additionally, all components used
have to be digitally signed to prevent the possibility
of modification.
There are other methods of realising an
authentication. One of it is Kerberos. This system
enables a good prevention of packet sniffing and
impersonation but adds complexity to administrate
the system [Atk96]. We used a directory service in
order to implement security as an asymmetric
architecture that uses digitally signed public keys
with information about the owner of the assigned
private key (certificates) instead of tokens that carry
information about the access rights to specific
functionality. The method using a directory service
is more efficient in verifying if a user is permitted to
use specific functionality of the system.
The next section shows how a directory
service is working and describes its advantages in
user management.
5. THE DIRECTORY SERVICE AS PART OF
THE INCREASED SECURITY CONCEPT
In the next step, we aim to “depict” the user
administration in the directory service so that we
will be able to differentiate between doctors and
MTAs so that access rights to patient data may be
classified. The major concern of DICOM is patient
management. Physicians can be assigned to pa-
tients. These references are depicted as a model in
the directory service.
Corresponding attributes of the DICOM
document files such as information about the
physician-in-charge may be read. If there are no
values assigned to these attributes, the administrator
will be asked to which physician the documents
should be assigned.
Next, in the directory service, objects are
being generated, establishing a reference to the
medical data in the directory service and to the
DICOM document. This concept can be enriched,
later on, by adding options for the checking of
access rights (adding to and changing attribute
entries in DICOM-documents).
After the physician has received the patient’s
data, the transfer of image data is initiated. In this
case, the images concerned are not DICOM images
but scaled images compressed as a format developed
by the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG).
Thus, a preview becomes possible. These pieces of
data do not need extra protection when transmitted
since they cannot be assigned to any specific
patient.
Once an image from the preview has been
chosen for processing, the server transmits the
original DICOM image. It must be taken into
consideration here that patient information is
transmitted together with the image.
Thus, in this case, secure transmission of
data is vital. If the headers (DICOM documents) of
the DICOM images are being administered in the
directory service, secure transmission is ensured by
using a SSL-link.
The data can be separated into image data
and DICOM document data. DICOM document
data is administered in the directory service and is
linked to the image data (still being stored on a file
system) via a reference connection.
Thus, image data can be safely transmitted
without needing to be encoded and patient data as
well as data needed for the visualisation of an image
can be transmitted via an encoded link.
The DICOM protocol is not necessary for the
intranet component of the patient database since the
elements of this component should not be replaced.
For dealing with the outer, image-producing
modalities, the DICOM protocol must be used since
it configures the intranet components to the
interaction of image-producing modality. It is
sufficient to create a basis for a DICOM-protocol
which supports the properties needed by the patient
database. This basis can be expanded later on.
It is necessary, though, to integrate security
aspects into the DICOM-protocol. The transport
layer security (TLS) support feature will be added
(according to the standard it will be added as
´handshake`). Using foreign applications provided
by the DICOM-protocol does not make much sense
since such applications are not defined for patient
database properties.
Contacting externally located internet
components requires taking extra steps to protect
the intranet. One possibility to do so would be
firewalls. However, firewalls are not very useful for
transmitting documents. Much rather, they are fit
for making interaction of users via the internet
possible. The alternative solution is a firewall-
principle which allows a separation of internet and
intranet while transmitting data. This concept has
been evaluated in banking and is now one of the
components being integrated into PACS. Its
predominant feature is, in particular, an easier
configuration than that of firewalls.
6. CONCLUSION
Easier and faster transmission of medical data
between hospitals and practising physicians is
becoming increasingly important which results in a
growing demand for internet and intranet
applications. Since unauthorised access to infor-
mation about patients must be prevented, it is
important that data transmission be extremely safe.
In this paper, we suggested SSL for secure
transmission and as a defence mechanism for
attacks located externally (i.e. on the internet) we
proposed the early-called ` floodgates´ [Haf98] now
renamed in `lock keeper´, a concept developed at
the IT. Even for authorised users, access rights must
be assigned, determining which data may be
accessed by which user. A directory service based
on a LDAP-protocol was the right choice for the
administration of legitimate access. Signing the
components of the system prevents from modi-
fication in order to allow third persons to gain
access to the system.
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